The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence by Imwinkelried, Edward J.
Volume 30 Issue 6 Article 6 
1985 
The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat 
to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
Edward J. Imwinkelried 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the Future of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 Vill. L. Rev. 1465 (1985). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss6/6 
This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1985]
THE NEED TO AMEND FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
404(b): THE THREAT TO THE FUTURE OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIEDt
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................... 1465
II. THE STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF RULES 403 AND
404 (b) .............................................. 147 1
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 ...................... 1472
1. The Measure of the Burden ..................... 1472
2. The Allocation of the Burden ................... 1474
B. The Relationship of Rule 403 to Rule 404(b) ........ 1479
III. THE DESIRABILITY OF AMENDING RULE 404(b) ........ 1484
A. The General Soundness of the Allocation and Measure of
the Burden Under Rule 403 ....................... 1485
B. The Application of Rule 403 's Burden to Uncharged
M isconduct Evidence .............................. 1487
IV. THE NECESSITY FOR AMENDING RULE 404(b) ......... 1491
V . CONCLUSION ........................................ 1497
I. INTRODUCTION
THE advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 was a
heralded event. When President Ford signed the bill estab-
lishing the rules on January 3 of that year, he stated that the rules
created "for the first time in our history uniform rules of evidence
on the admissibility of proof in Federal court proceedings."'
With the exception of the areas of presumption and privilege,2
the Federal Rules comprehensively regulate federal evidence
law.3 Moreover, the Federal Rules dramatically liberalize many
t Professor of Law, University of California at Davis; B.A., University of San
Francisco 1967; J.D., University of San Francisco 1969; former chair, Evidence
Section, American Association of Law Schools.
1. Statement by the President Upon Signing H.R. 5463 Into Law, 11
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 12 (Jan. 3, 1975).
2. See FED. R. EviD. 301, 501.
3. Contrast, for example, the residual hearsay provision in the Federal
Rules of Evidence with the treatment of the same problem under one of the
most detailed state evidence statutes, the California Evidence Code. Section
1200 of the California Evidence Code declares that "[e]xcept as provided by law,
(1465)
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evidentiary doctrines. The Federal Rules relax the restrictions on
the admission of expert opinions by abolishing the "ultimate
fact" prohibition,4 and by allowing experts to base opinions on
data that is not independently admissible in evidence. 5 The Fed-
eral Rules similarly lower the barriers to the receipt of hearsay by
creating new hearsay exceptions,6 and by expanding recognized
exceptions.7 Rule 402 underscores the bias in favor of admitting
relevant evidence by decreeing that "[a]ll relevant evidence is ad-
missible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory au-
thority."8 The liberalizing influence of the Federal Rules has
quickly spread to state courts, as thirty jurisdictions have adopted
evidence codes patterned after the rules. 9
One of the most important rules is rule 404(b). The rule
reads:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissi-
ble to prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of mo-
tive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
hearsay evidence is inadmissible." CAL. EvID. CODE § 1200(b) (West 1966 &
Supp. 1985). Section 160 of the California Evidence Code, however, defines
"law" as including "decisional law." Id. § 160 (West 1966 & Supp. 1985).
Hence, the California Evidence Code preserves the judge's common-law power
to create new hearsay exceptions and does not announce any criteria that a trial
judge must consider in deciding whether to fashion a new hearsay exception. In
contrast, rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allow the
judge to admit statements that do not fall within an enumerated hearsay excep-
tion. The rules state specific factors which the judge must weigh in determining
whether to admit such statements. See Imwinkelried, The Scope of the Residual
Hearsay Exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 239 (1978).
4. See FED. R. EVID. 704.
5. See FED. R. EvID. 703.
6. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (present sense impression); FED. R. EVID.
803(18) (learned treatise).
7. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(4) (statements for purposes of medical diagno-
sis or treatment).
8. FED. R. EvID. 402.
9. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming have
adopted evidence codes patterned after the rules. See Wroth, The Federal Rules of
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identity, or absence of mistake or accident.10
The first sentence of rule 404(b) forbids the proponent, usually a
prosecutor, from offering evidence of the defendant's uncharged
misconduct to support a general inference of bad character. The
prosecutor may not introduce the evidence to establish the de-
fendant's immoral, law-breaking character and then rely upon the
defendant's demonstrated bad character to increase the
probability that the defendant committed the crime alleged in the
indictment or information. The second sentence of rule 404(b)
does, however, permit the proponent to offer such evidence when
it has "independent" logical relevance. That is, the second sen-
tence of the rule permits the proponent to introduce evidence
that is relevant under a non-character theory, such as proving the
defendant's motive, intent, or identity.1'
These two sentences of rule 404(b) codify the "uncharged
misconduct" doctrine. The doctrine is of enormous importance
in civil and criminal practice. For example, in products liability
cases, proof of other accidents involving the defendant's product
often is the most cogent proof of the product's hazardous charac-
ter. 12 Similarly, in criminal practice, the admissibility of the de-
fendant's other crimes is the premier evidentiary issue. In most
jurisdictions, alleged errors in the admission of evidence of un-
charged misconduct are the most common ground for appeal,' 3
and in many states they are the most frequent ground for rever-
sal.14 In federal courts, rule 404(b) has generated more reported
decisions than any other subsection of the Federal Rules. 15
Like the Federal Rules' opinion and hearsay provisions, rule
404(b) has had the effect of liberalizing evidentiary standards.
For example, rule 404(b) has accelerated the trend toward the so-
10. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
11. United States v. Forgione, 487 F.2d 364, 366 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 976 (1974).
12. See generally Note, Product Liability Litigation: Impact of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b) Upon Admissibility Standards of Prior Accident Evidence, 61 WASH. U.L.Q.
799 (1983).
13. See Rules of Evidence (Supplement): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 201, 203 (1973)
(letter of Professor Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.) ("the issue of evidence most often
raised in the federal appellate cases") [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; Note, Ad-
missibility of Other Offense Evidence After State v. Houghton, 25 S.D.L. REV. 166, 167
(1980).
14. See Note, Evidence-The Emotional Propensity Exception, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
153, 156 n.29 (1978).
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called inclusionary approach to the uncharged misconduct doc-
trine.' 6 The traditional view in America has been the exclusion-
ary approach, which once was dominant in three-fifths of the
states and a majority of federal circuits. 17 Under the exclusionary
approach, there is a general rule that evidence of uncharged mis-
conduct should be excluded unless it fits within a finite list of rec-
ognized exceptions-including motive, identity, and intent.18 If
the evidence of uncharged misconduct does not fit squarely
within a previously approved pigeonhole, the evidence automati-
cally is inadmissible. In contrast, the inclusionary approach iden-
tifies only one verboten theory: attempting to support a general
inference of bad character.19 This approach allows the proponent
to offer evidence of uncharged misconduct for "any purpose
other than to show a mere propensity or disposition on the part
of the defendant to commit the crime." 20 Nine federal circuits
have determined that Congress' use of "such as" in rule 404(b)
commits the federal courts to the inclusionary approach. 2'
Another common limitation on the admission of evidence of
the defendant's uncharged crimes has been the requirement that
the prosecutor present extraordinarily strong proof that the de-
fendant committed the uncharged act. Most courts insist that the
prosecutor's foundational evidence satisfy some variation of the
standard of clear and convincing proof.22 The Federal Rules,
however, do not codify any requirement for clear and convincing
proof of the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the un-
16. See Reed, Admission of Other Criminal Act Evidence After Adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 113 (1984).
17. Chesnutt, The Admissibility of Other Crimes in Texas, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1409
n.4 (1972) (quoting Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America,
51 HARV. L. REV. 988, 1036 n.221 (1938)).
18. A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE
OF CRIMINAL CASES § 368, at 1-501 (4th ed. 1984).
19. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 979 (1974).
20. 484 F.2d at 134. Even so, the trial judge may exclude the evidence if its
probative value is outweighed by the risk that its admission will create a substan-
tial danger of undue prejudice to the accused. Id.
21. Reed, supra note 16, at 159-60 (identifying the First, Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits as determining that rule 404(b) is an
inclusionary rule). See also United States v. Moore, 732 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir.
1984); United States v. Gustafson, 728 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 380 (1984).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(in sentencing of defendant for conspiracy to receive and receiving goods stolen
from interstate commerce, evidence of defendant's membership in organized
crime is admissible if clear, unequivocal, and convincing), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1073 (1980); 2J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 404[10], at 404-71.
4
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charged act. For that reason, some courts have concluded that
rule 404(b) requires only proof sufficient to support a permissive
inference that the defendant committed the uncharged act. 23
Rule 404(b) may liberalize the admissibility of evidence of
uncharged misconduct in still another respect. Before the enact-
ment of the Federal Rules, it was well settled in many jurisdictions
that the prosecutor had the burden of convincing the judge that
the probative value of the evidence outweighs any attendant dan-
gers such as prejudice.2 4 Thus, the courts took a cautious attitude
toward such evidence 25 and admitted it only in cases of strict ne-
cessity. 26 In some jurisdictions, evidence of uncharged miscon-
duct was so disfavored that the courts imposed upon the
prosecution a "heavy burden" of proving that the probative value
of admitting the proferred evidence outweighs the inherently
prejudicial effect of admitting such evidence. 27 Rule 404(b) may
overthrow the cautious judicial attitude toward evidence of un-
charged misconduct. The rule itself is silent on the question of
the burden of persuading the judge that the probative value of
the evidence outweighs the dangers attendant to admitting it.
The advisory committee note accompanying rule 404(b) does re-
fer the reader to rule 403.28 Rule 403 states that relevant evi-
dence is admissible unless "its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue de-
23. United States v. Astling, 733 F.2d 1446 (11 th Cir. 1984) (in prosecution
of charges arising out of scheme to import and distribute marijuana, evidence of
earlier marijuana smuggling venture is admissible if jury could reasonably find
from the evidence that defendant committed the extrinsic offense); United
States v. Lemaire, 712 F.2d 944 (5th Cir.) (in prosecution for writing and pos-
sessing counterfeit United States notes with intent to defraud, evidence of prior
conviction of passing counterfeit bills is admissible if there is sufficient evidence
for jury to conclude that defendant committed the extrinsic act), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 535 (1983); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 912-13 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
24. United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 739 (9th Cir. 1985) (Ninth Cir-
cuit adhered to common law allocation of burden to prosecution before and
after enactment of Federal Rules); People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d 604, 685 P.2d
1126, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1984); People v. Louie, 158 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 28,
205 Cal. Rptr. 247, 262 (1984); State v. Brown, 670 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201, 204-08 (10th Cir.
1972).
26. State v. Collins, 669 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Mo. 1984). See also State v. Pow-
ell, 684 S.W.2d 514, 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (evidence of extrinsic crimes
should be subjected to "rigid scrutiny").
27. Smith v. State, 646 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
28. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee note.
1985] 1469
5
Imwinkelried: The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30: p. 1465
lay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence." 29 The sentence's passive wording arguably manifests a
legislative intent to allocate the burden of persuasion to the party
opposing admission; and once the proponent has demonstrated
the probative worth of the evidence, the burden shifts to the op-
ponent to convince the judge that the dangers outweigh the pro-
bative value. Furthermore, the opponent's burden is onerous;
the opponent must show that the dangers "substantially" out-
weigh the probative worth. If this is the correct interpretation of
rule 403, and if rule 404(b) incorporates rule 403's balancing test,
rule 404(b) turns the common-law rules upside down.
The proper allocation of the burden under rule 404(b) has
precipitated a sharp controversy. Even in jurisdictions that have
adopted rule 404(b), some courts adhere to the common-law view
and continue to insist that the prosecutor has the burden of show-
ing that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its danger-
ous tendencies.30 The advocates of the common-law view invoke
precedent as well as policy. The cautious judicial attitude toward
evidence of uncharged misconduct not only is deeply ingrained in
many jurisidictions; the attitude also is eminently sensible. All the
research conducted to date-studies by the Chicago Jury Pro-
ject,31 the London School of Economics,3 2 and the National Sci-
ence Foundation Law and Social Science Program 33-confirm
that evidence of the defendant's uncharged crimes is an especially
dangerous type of evidence. Evidence of uncharged misconduct
can effectively strip the defendant of the presumption of inno-
cence3 4 and predispose the jury to convict. 35 The virulent nature
of such evidence makes it understandable that courts would pre-
fer the common-law view. The difficulty, though, is that the Fed-
eral Rules nowhere codify the common-law view. The continued
imposition of the common-law burden of proof seems to violate
29. FED. R. EvID. 403.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 830 (9th Cir.
1982).
31. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160-61, 178-79 (1966).
32. Note, Developments in Evidence of Other Crimes, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REr. 535,
544 (1974); Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial. Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70
YALE L.J. 763 (1961).
33. Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson, Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of
Evidence: Can Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 Wis. L.
REV. 1147, 1162 (1983).
34. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 179.
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the mandate of rule 402 that relevant evidence should be admit-
ted unless exclusion is required by the Constitution, a federal
statute, or a Supreme Court rule prescribed pursuant to statutory
authority. 36
This article examines the controversy over the question of
whether the common-law view has survived the adoption of rule
404(b). The first section addresses the dispute as a question of
statutory construction. Although the question is not free from
doubt, the section concludes that the soundest construction of
the Federal Rules is that rule 404(b) imposes upon the opponent
the burden of proving that the dangers attending a particular
item of uncharged misconduct evidence substantially outweigh
the evidence's probative value. The second section of the article
reaches the policy merits of the dispute. That section argues that
the result achieved through the common-law view is superior to
the result seemingly required by rule 404(b). Accordingly, the
second section urges that rule 404(b) be amended to reinstate the
common-law view. The third and final section advances the thesis
that it is not only desirable but imperative that rule 404(b) be
amended. This final section draws on the historical experience of
the California Evidence Code, and contends that if rule 404(b) is
not amended, many courts may succumb to the temptation to cir-
cumvent rule 402 in order to "correct" Congress' mistake in
abandoning the common-law burden. As previously stated, rule
402 is the provision making all relevant evidence admissible un-
less there is a basis for exclusion in the Constitution, a statute,
another Federal Rule of Evidence, or a Supreme Court rule
promulgated pursuant to statutory authority. The courts' treat-
ment of rule 402 is the key to the success of the Federal Rules as a
self-contained evidence code. As a result of congressional inac-
tion on rule 404(b), some courts may begin to develop a perni-
cious tendency to disregard rule 402 whenever the rule
apparently permits the admission of dangerously prejudicial
evidence.
II. THE STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF RULES 403 AND 404(b)
To resolve the question of statutory construction, we must
consider rule 403 and then analyze the interaction between that
rule and rule 404(b).
36. FED. R. EvID. 402.
1985] 1471
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A. Federal Rule of Evidence 403
Under rule 403, the trial judge must balance the probative
worth of the evidence against attendant dangers such as the risk
that the evidence will prejudice the jury or tempt the jury to de-
cide the case on an improper basis.3 7 Once it is clear that balanc-
ing is necessary, the questions of the allocation and measure of
the burden naturally arise. 38 Who has the burden of convincing
the judge that one factor outweighs the other, and what is the
extent of that party's burden? Is it sufficient that one factor
barely outweighs the other, or must the party show that that fac-
tor exceeds the other by a greater margin?
There is support for the view that under rule 403, as at com-
mon law in many jurisdictions, the proponent of evidence must
show that probative value outweighs danger and that the measure
of the burden is demonstrating only that one factor barely ex-
ceeds the other. One leading commentator has asserted that
under rule 403, "it is proper to resolve all doubts concerning the
balance between probative value and prejudice in favor of preju-
dice" and against admissibility. 39 In contrast, Saltzburg and Red-
den have asserted that while rule 403 allocates the burden to the
opponent, the term "substantially" in rule 403 should not be read
literally. 40 Their position is that the burdened party need demon-
strate only that one factor slightly outweighs the other.41
1. The Measure of the Burden
The position of Saltzburg and Redden understates the im-
portance of the adverb "substantially" in rule 403. When Con-
37. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note.
38. This article does not use the term "burden" to implicate the normal
technical sense of the burden of proof. The normal sense of the expression
applies when a court is allocating the risk of nonpersuasion with regard to the
existence or occurrence of historical facts such as crimes or accidents. C. Mc-
CORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 336-337 (3d ed. 1984). Under rule 403, the focus is not
on whether discrete historical events occurred. Rather, the judge is balancing
the intangible factors of probative value and prejudicial danger against each
other. Thus, we are using the term "burden" in a looser sense. S. SALTZBURG &
K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 101 (3d ed. 1982). The most
fundamental meaning of the burden, however, is the risk of nonpersuasion. C.
MCCORMICK, supra, §§ 336-337. In this sense, there is a burden under rule 403.
Rule 403 prescribes the course of action for the judge when the balance between
prejudicial danger and probative worth is too close to call in the judge's mind.
39. Dolan, Rule 403: The Preudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220,
233 (1976).
40. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 38, at 101.
41. Id.
1472 [Vol. 30: p. 1465
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gress deliberated over the Federal Rules, there was a split of
authority among the federal and state courts over the proper
measure of the burden.42 Some jurisdictions required the bur-
dened party to demonstrate only a "mere imbalance" between
probative value and danger.43 The majority formulation, how-
ever, was that one factor had to substantially outweigh the
other.44 We must presume that Congress was aware of this divi-
sion of authority when it adopted the final wording for rule 403. 4 5
On the premise that Congress was aware of the split of authority,
the inclusion of "substantially" in rule 403 manifests an intent to
reject the minority view that it is sufficient if one factor barely
outweighs the other.
The significance of "substantially" was highlighted during
the congressional consideration of the rules. While the rules
were pending in Congress, law reviews carried numerous articles
calling attention to the presence of the adverb in the proposed
rule. 46 Witnesses who appeared during the congressional hear-
ings on the rules did likewise. For example, during the testimony
of Richard Keatinge, the chairperson of the California Law Revi-
sion Commission, Mr. Keatinge submitted his written statement
with the word "substantially" italicized.47
Cases construing rule 403 ascribe the ordinary, lay usage to
the term "substantially." The common meaning of a term ordi-
narily is the preferred usage.4 8 To a lay person, "substantial" de-
notes "to a large degree." 49 Applying that meaning, most courts
require that one factor exceed the other by a wide margin. In the
cases in which the courts have invoked rule 403, they typically
characterize the probative value of the excluded evidence as defi-
cient, 50 de minimis, 5 1 dubious,5 2 low, 53 marginal, 54 minimal,5 5
42. Dolan, supra note 39, at 235-36 nn.55-56.
43. Id. at 236.
44. Id. at 235.
45. See 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.12 (4th
ed. 1973).
46. See, e.g., Schmertz, Relevancy and Its Policy Counterweights: A Brief Excursion
Through Article IV of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. B.J. 1, 5 (1974).
47. Rules of Evidence, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 127, 139 (1974).
48. See 2A C. SANDS, supra note 45, § 47.28.
49. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 876 (1972).
50. United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
51. See Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence:
A Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME LAW. 556, 578 (1984).
52. United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 959 (1974).
1985] 1473
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miniscule,56 scant,57 seriously lacking, 58 slight,5 9 tangential, 60 ten-
uous,6 1 vague, 62 or virtually nonexistent. 63 In the same opinions,
the courts label the prejudicial potential of the evidence as egre-
gious, 64 extreme,65 great, 66 gross, 67 heinous, 68 high,69 overmas-
tering,70 or strong.7 1 In describing the balance between the
factors, the courts declare that one factor must far exceed, 72 heav-
ily outweigh, 73 or overwhelm,74 the other. The language of these
opinions makes it unmistakable that the courts take "substan-
tially" in rule 403 seriously. The courts have opted to give the
term its usual, lay meaning and to require the burdened party to
show that one factor exceeds the other by a goodly margin.
2. The Allocation of the Burden
Who is the burdened party-the proponent of the evidence
or the opponent? There are four different arguments pointing
53. State v. Allies, 186 Mont. 99, 606 P.2d 1043 (1979).
54. Nordine v. State, 95 Nev. 425, 596 P.2d 245 (1979).
55. Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963, 968 (7th Cir.
1983).
56. United States v. Davila, 704 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1983).
57. United States v. Roark, 753 F.2d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 1985); Larue v.
National Union Elec. Corp., 571 F.2d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 1978).
58. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1272
(8th Cir. 1980).
59. United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 513-15 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).
60. Dyer v. State, 666 P.2d 438 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
61. Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., Am. Home Prods, 594 F.2d 1051, 1057-
58 (5th Cir. 1979).
62. See Sharpe, supra note 51, at 581.
63. Smith v. Spina, 477 F.2d 1140, 1145-46 (3d Cir. 1973).
64. Sharpe, supra note 51, at 566.
65. United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
65. Cohn v. Papke, 655 F.2d 191, 194-95 (9th Cir. 1981); Angus v. State, 76
Wis. 2d 191, 251 N.W.2d 28, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977).
67. United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
68. United States v. Bobo, 586 F.2d 355, 372 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 976 (1979).
69. United States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919, 925-26 (10th Cir. 1979);
Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., Am. Home Prods., 594 F.2d 1051, 1057-58 (5th
Cir. 1979).
70. Adkinson v. State, 611 P.2d 528, 532 (Alaska), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 876
(1980).
71. Savoie v. Otto Candies, Inc., 692 F.2d 363, 369-71 & n.8 (5th Cir.
1982).
72. State v. Mehralian, 301 N.W.2d 409, 419 (N.D. 1981).
73. Nyzio v. Vaillancourt, 382 A.2d 856, 860 (Me. 1978).
74. Savoie v. Otto Candies, Inc., 692 F.2d 363, 370-71 (5th Cir. 1982); Peo-
ple v. McKinney, 410 Mich. 413, 301 N.W.2d 824 (1981).
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 6 [1985], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss6/6
NEED TO AMEND RULE 404(b)
toward the conclusion that rule 403 allocates the burden to the
opponent of logically relevant evidence.
The first argument relates to the measure of the burden, dis-
cussed above. Rule 403 allows the exclusion of relevant evidence
only when the dangers "substantially" outweigh the probative
value, and most courts interpret "substantially" to mean that the
dangers must far exceed the probative worth. If the proponent
has the burden, the burden is to prove that the probative value is
not substantially outweighed by the dangers of admission. That
burden would be highly unusual and awkward. Not only would
such a burden be essentially negative; it also would place the pro-
ponent in a strange position by requiring him to establish less
than even a balance in his or her favor. It is true that on some
issues, a few jurisdictions allocate burdens to parties even when
the burden requires the proponent to establish less than a
probability. For example, under the California Evidence Code, a
criminal defendant sometimes has the "burden" of raising a rea-
sonable doubt. 75 Yet, such allocations are rare. If the measure of
the burden is heavily weighted in favor of one factor, as rule 403's
burden is biased in favor of admissibility, the simpler, normal
practice is to allocate the burden to the party urging the opposing
factor. 76 Typically, the court announces that the latter party must
establish the proposition by a heightened standard such as clear
and convincing evidence. 77 Courts ordinarily prefer "an interpre-
tation of a statute that produces a reasonable result." 78 It would
be exceptional and awkward to assign the proponent of evidence
the burden under rule 403 when the burden's measure is that the
probative value must be substantially outweighed by the prejudi-
cial dangers. Thus, it is more reasonable to assume that when
Congress chose that measure, Congress allocated the burden to
the opponent.
Secondly, the language of rule 403 supports the interpreta-
tion that the rule allocates the burden to the opponent. Rule 403
is written in the passive voice.79 In contrast, rule 412 and rule
75. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 115, 502 (West 1966 & Supp. 1984).
76. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 38, § 340, at 959.
77. Id.
78. 2A C. SANDS, supra note 45, § 45.12. In the context of the interpreta-
tion of a document, "unreasonable" can mean "unusual and extraordinary." J.
MURRAY, CONTRACTS § 116, at 247 n.8 (rev. ed. 1974) (citing Bank of Cashton v.
La Crosse County Scandinavia Town Mutual Ins. Co., 216 Wis. 513, 518, 257
N.W. 451 (1934)).
79. See Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evi-
dence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 797 n.74 (1981). In this respect, rule 403 is similar
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609(a)(1) are written in the active voice. Rule 412 governs the
admissibility of evidence of the prior sexual conduct of complain-
ants in rape cases. The rule allows the judge to admit such evi-
dence when "the probative value of such evidence outweighs the
danger of unfair prejudice." 80 Rule 609(a)(1) controls the admis-
sion of evidence regarding certain types of convictions offered to
impeach the defendant's credibility. Before admitting the convic-
tion record, rule 609(a)(1) requires that the judge determine that
"the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prej-
udicial effect to the defendant." 8' Rule 412 is so new that there is
little case law construing the statute, but there is a large body of
decisional law interpreting rule 609. Notwithstanding some au-
thority to the contrary, 82 the virtually unanimous sentiment
among the commentators 8 3 and courts 84 is that rule 609(a)(1) as-
signs the burden to the prosecutor offering the evidence of a
prior conviction.
That construction is in accord with rule 609(a)(1)'s wording.
The sentence in question is written in the active voice. The voice
of the sentence implies that the subject-probative value-must
actively overcome the object-any prejudicial dangers. The pas-
sive wording of rule 403 creates the contrary implication, sug-
gesting that the probative value can be overcome by prejudicial
dangers. When the legislature decides to use varying language in
similar statutes, there is an inference that different intents in-
spired the differing language8 5 and that the legislature selected
to its counterparts in earlier model evidence codes. Rule 303(1) of the Model
Code of Evidence authorized the judge to exclude relevant evidence "if he finds
that its probative value is outweighed" by specified risks. MODEL CODE Or Evi-
DENCE Rule 303(1) (1942). Uniform rule 45 used the wording, "its probative
value is substantially outweighed." UNIF. R. EVID. 45 (1953).
80. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(3).
81. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
82. See United States v. Vanderbosch, 610 F.2d 95, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1979)
("defendant is required to show that the prejudicial effect outweighs probative
value at the time the motion is made to suppress the prior conviction").
83. 3 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 315, at 326-27
(1979); S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 38, at 365; Curran, Federal Rule of
Evidence 609(a), 49 TEMP. L.Q. 890, 894 (1976).
84. United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1985); Government of
Virgin Islands v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 761 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v.
Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083, 1092 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 (1981);
United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1323 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1043 (1981); United States v. Lewis, 626 F.2d 940, 948-50 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
United States v. Hendershot, 614 F.2d 648, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Gross, 603 F.2d 757, 758 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Stewart, 581
F.2d 973, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
85. See, 2A C. SANDS, supra note 45, § 51.02 (citing Commonwealth v. Bu-
1476 [Vol. 30: p. 1465
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different words to indicate that it contemplated differing legal
consequences.8 6 The inference is particularly strong when the
legislature uses different wording in two parts of the same statu-
tory scheme.8 7 Congress worded rule 403 differently than either
rule 412 or rule 609(a)(1). Congress' deliberate choice of differ-
ing language implies that unlike rules 412 and 609, rule 403 allo-
cates the burden to the opponent of the evidence.
The third argument favoring construing the text of rule 403
as allocating the burden to the opponent rests on rule 403's im-
mediate context, specifically, rule 402. A statute's context, which
includes other provisions in the same statutory scheme,88 sheds
light on the meaning of its text.8 9 Statutory provisions do not
even have to be enacted simultaneously to be deemed part of the
same scheme and in pai materia.90 Thus, it stands to reason that
when provisions are enacted simultaneously and placed immedi-
ately next to each other in the statutory scheme, as in the case of
rules 402 and 403, one provision can furnish valuable clues to the
meaning of the other. Rule 402 is cast in roughly the same mold
as its counterparts in prior model evidence codes. Rule 9(f) of
the Model Code of Evidence stated that "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in these Rules ... all relevant evidence is admissible." 9'
Uniform rule 7(0 was virtually the same as rule 403, providing:
"Except as otherwise provided in these Rules ... all relevant evi-
dence is admissible." 92 Like its earlier counterparts, rule 402 cre-
ates a bias in favor of admitting relevant evidence and when there
is ambiguity, "Rule 402's clear result is to make relevant evidence
admissible."93 Allocating the burden under rule 403 to the oppo-
nent similarly effectuates the bias manifest in rule 402.
The final argument for allocating the burden to the opponent
is based on the broader context of rule 403, the basic philosophy
permeating the Federal Rules of Evidence. As previously stated,
zak, 197 Pa. Super. 514, 516, 179 A.2d 248, 250 (1962) ("[W]here words of a
later statute differ from those of a previous one on the same subject, they pre-
sumably are intended to have a different construction.")
86. Id. § 45.12.
87. Id. (citing People v. Ector, 231 Cal. App. 2d 619, 42 Cal. Rptr. 388(1965)).
88. Id.
89. Id. §§ 45.12, 50.01-.02.
90. Id. § 51.03.
91. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 9(f) (1942).
92. UNIF. R. EVID. 7(f) (1953).
93. 1J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 402[07], at 402-29 (quot-
ing Drafter's Analysis of Military Rule of Evidence 402).
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the Federal Rules significantly liberalize the admission of both
opinion evidence and hearsay statements. 94 Rule 402 is one ex-
ample of the fact that the Federal Rules, as a whole, demonstrate
a bias toward admissibility.95 The policy theme running through-
out the Federal Rules favors the admissibility of logically relevant
evidence, 96 and their basic thrust is the relaxation of the barriers
to admitting relevant evidence. 97 In the early hearings on the
then proposed Federal Rules of Evidence before the House of
Representatives, Albert E. Jenner, Jr., the chairperson of the
United States Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, asserted that "the overall philosophy and
thrust of the rules" is to "place the burden upon he who seeks the
exclusion of relevant evidence." 98 The allocation of the burden
under rule 403 to the opponent would therefore be consonant
with the overall spirit of the Federal Rules.
Rule 403 contemplates that the trial judge will assess the pro-
bative value and dangers of evidence on a case-by-case, ad hoc
basis. 99 The exclusion of relevant evidence under rule 403 is an
extraordinary remedy, 00 and therefore courts should exercise
the power to exclude cautiously' 01 and sparingly. 10 2 Rule 403
94. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
95. See Rothstein, Some Themes in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED.
B.J. 21, 21-26 (1974).
96. United States v. Guerrero, 667 F.2d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 964 (1982); United States v. 1129.75 Acres of Land, 473 F.2d 996,
999 (8th Cir. 1973); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: EVIDENCE § 5213, at 258 (1978); Dolan, supra note 39, at 236. The com-
ment to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 402, modeled after Federal Rule 402, states
that "[t]he rule favors the admission of relevant evidence." 22 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra, § 5221, at 309 (citing MINN. R. EVID. 403 committee comment
(1977); MINN. R. CT. 332 (1985)).
97. 1J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 93, 403[03], at 403-46 to -51.
See also Rossi, The Silent Revolution, 9 LITIGATION, A.B.A., Winter 1983, at 13.
98. Rules of Evidence, Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 77, 87
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Rules of Evidence].
99. State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983); Rothstein,
supra note 95, at 21.
100. United States v. King, 713 F.2d 627, 631 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1924 (1984); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 633 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982).
101. United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 862 (1979).
102. Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1502 (11 th Cir.
1985); Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 766 (11 th Cir. 1985); United States v. Plotke, 725
F.2d 1303, 1308 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 151 (1984); United States v.
King, 713 F.2d 627, 631 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1924 (1984);
Ebanks v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 688 F.2d 716, 722 (11 th Cir. 1982),
1478 [Vol. 30: p. 1465
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places greater emphasis on the admissibility of probative evi-
dence.' 0 3 Thus, the net effect of the rule is to create a presump-
tion 10 4 or balance' 0 5 favoring admissibility. When there is a
genuine doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of admit-
ting relevant evidence.' 0 6 Further, an examination of the legisla-
tive intent behind rule 403 indicates that Congress intended to
allocate the burden under the rule to the opponent of relevant
evidence. That burden demands that the opponent convince the
judge that the dangers attendant to admitting the evidence out-
weigh the probative value of the evidence by a wide margin. The
measure of the burden, the text of rule 403, rule 402, and the
rules' basic philosophy all support this allocation of the burden.
B. The Relationship of Rule 403 to Rule 404(b)
The next question that arises is whether and how rule 403
relates to rule 404(b). Some courts have held that under rule
404(b), the prosecution still has the burden of demonstrating that
the probative value of uncharged misconduct evidence outweighs
the attendant probative dangers. 0 7 A number of distinguished
commentators support the same view. This view preserves the
common-law allocation of the burden to the proponent of the evi-
dence.' 0 8 The contrary view is that rule 404(b) incorporates rule
403's balancing test, requiring the opponent to convince the
judge that the prejudicial dangers substantially outweigh the pro-
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983); United States v. Pirolli, 673 F.2d 1200, 1203
(1 th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 871 (1982); 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra
note 83, § 124, at 14-15; 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5224, at
321 n.25.
103. Gruzen v. State, 267 Ark. 380, 591 S.W.2d 342, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
852 (1980); 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 403[03], at 403-50.
104. Eben v. State, 599 P.2d 700, 711 (Alaska 1979) (quoting the commen-
tary to Alaska Rule 403), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. 1984); Privacy of
Rape Victims, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 6 (1976) (statement of Roger A. Pauley, Deputy
Chief, Legislation and Special Projects Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of
Justice), [hereinafter cited as Hearing, Privacy of Rape Victims]; S. SALTZBURG & K.
REDDEN, supra note 38, at 101; 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15,
403[03], at 403-50.
105. United States v. Moore, 732 F.2d 983, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Dente v.
Riddell, Inc., 664 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d
782, 797 (8th Cir. 1980); 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 84, § 125.
106. United States v. Cole, 670 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1982); 1 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 15, 403[01], at 403-10.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 830 (9th Cir.
1982).
108. 2J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 404[18], at 404-156.
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bative value. The latter view is a sounder interpretation of the
Federal Rules.
Rule 403 was intended to have virtually universal applica-
tion.'0 9 On its face, the rule purports to apply to any item of
evidence. The commentators have observed that rule 403 "ap-
parently cuts across the entire body of the Rules,""t 0 and that
"every rule of admissibility [is] subject to the power of discretion-
ary exclusion" under rule 403.111 The solitary exception that the
courts have recognized is the admissibility of evidence of convic-
tions qualifying under rule 609(a)(2). Rule 609(a)(2) refers to a
narrow category of convictions, those involving "dishonesty or
false statements."' " 2 The rule omits any mention of balancing
the probative value of the conviction against prejudicial danger.
Most courts and students of federal evidence law have concluded
that evidence of prior convictions qualifying under rule 609(a)(2)
cannot be excluded by balancing." 3 The reasoning underlying
the majority view is that in light of the explicit inclusion of a bal-
ancing test in rule 609(a)(1), the omission of such a test in
609(a)(2) manifests congressional intent to make those convic-
tions automatically admissible. 1' 4 To date, the courts have not
found such an intent in any other provision. Thus, rule 403 inter-
faces with the other provisions of the Federal Rules unless, like
rule 609(a)(2), a particular rule manifests a congressional intent
to preclude rule 403's application.
There is strong evidence, however, that Congress intended
rule 404(b) rulings to be subject to rule 403. During the hearings
on the Federal Rules before the House Subcommittee on Crimi-
nal Justice, Representative William Cohen submitted the written
comments of Professor Richard Field, the consultant to the Maine
109. Dolan, supra note 39, at 269. In this respect, rule 403 is similar to rule
303 of the Model Code of Evidence, and "the universality of application" of rule
303 has long been recognized. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 303 (1942).
110. Rothstein, supra note 95, at 29.
111. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5213, at 262-63.
112. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
113. See United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1331 (7th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Kuecker, 740 F.2d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Wong, 703 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 140 (1983); United States
v. Leyva, 659 F.2d 118, 121-22 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982);
United States v. Coats, 652 F.2d 1002, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 3J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 15, 609[03], at 609-62; id. 609[04], at 124 (Supp.
1984). See also United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1057 n.28 (D.C. Cir.
1983) ("The current weight of authority is that Rule 609(a)(2) crimes cannot be
excluded under Rule 403.").
114. 3J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 609[03], at 609-62.
1480 [Vol. 30: p. 1465
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Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence.1 15 Professor Field's
comments described his understanding of the operation of rule
404(b).11 6 The comments indicated that in Professor Field's view,
evidence satisfying rule 404(b) would not be automatically admis-
sible. 11 7 Rather, even when evidence of a defendant's uncharged
crime complied with rule 404(b), "the determination" of its ad-
missibility would be left "to other rules," presumably rule 403.118
The final Senate report on the Federal Rules of Evidence ex-
pressly states that the trial judge may apply the rule 403 factors to
evidence satisfying rule 404(b). 119 The advisory committee note
to rule 404(b) also mentions rule 403.120
It has been suggested that rule 404(b) only partially incorpo-
rates rule 403.121 It is possible that Congress intended that under
rule 404(b), the trial judge would "consider the kinds of facts ap-
propriate under Rule 403" but not use rule 403's balancing test
weighted in favor of admissibility. 122 This possibility is consistent
with the literal language of the Senate report and the advisory
committee note. The Senate report states that "the trial judge
may exclude [relevant evidence of uncharged misconduct] only
on the basis of those considerations set forth in Rule 403."123
Similarly, the advisory committee note to rule 404(b) alludes to
the judge's consideration of "factors appropriate for making deci-
sions of this kind under Rule 403."124 If the partial incorporation
theory is sound, the common-law allocation of the burden to the
proponent of uncharged misconduct evidence may survive the
adoption of the Federal Rules. If rule 404(b) incorporates rule
403's factors but not its balancing test, the trial judge still could
insist that the prosecutor show that the probative value of prof-
fered uncharged misconduct outweighs any apparent dangers. In
115. Hearings, supra note 13, at 268.
116. Id. at 269.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7071.
120. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee note.
121. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evi-
dence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 797 n.74 (1981).
122. Id. See also United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 923 n.16 (5th Cir.
1978) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
123. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7071.
124. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee note.
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the final analysis, however, the partial incorporation theory is
flawed.
The partial incorporation theory is at odds with the general
tenor of rule 404's legislative history. When the House Subcom-
mittee on Criminal Justice prepared the committee print of the
Federal Rules, the subcommittee added a note declaring that rule
404(b) was intended to place "greater emphasis on admissibil-
ity.' 1 25 The report of the House Committee on the Judiciary re-
affirmed that intent. 26 The courts have seized on that language
as proof that the draftsmen of rule 404(b) "intended to empha-
size admissibility of 'other crime' evidence."'' 27 The partial incor-
poration theory would effectively preserve the common-law
standard for the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evi-
dence-the status quo ante. Thus, the partial incorporation theory
would frustrate Congress' general intent to place greater stress
on the admission of relevant evidence of uncharged misconduct.
In contrast, the full incorporation of rule 403 into rule 404(b) ef-
fectuates the legislative intent.
There are more specific indications in the legislative history
that Congress appreciated that, under its scheme, evidence of un-
charged misconduct qualifying under rule 404(b) could be ex-
cluded only when it ran afoul of rule 403's balancing test. In an
analysis of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence presented to
both the House and the Senate, the Justice Department made it
clear that it believed that rule 404(b) fully incorporated rule 403's
balancing test. William Ruckelshaus, then acting deputy attorney
general, presented the Justice Department's analysis to the
House. 28 That analysis was highly influential with Congress, and
Congress ultimately adopted many of the revisions proposed by
the Justice Department. In his presentation, Mr. Ruckelshaus
urged Congress to clarify certain aspects of rule 404(b),12 9 but he
explained that the Justice Department understood relevant evi-
dence of uncharged misconduct to be excludable "[o]nly if the
probative value of these facts is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice."' 30 W. Vincent Rakestraw, assistant
125. Hearings, supra note 13, at 145, 154.
126. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7081.
127. United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 766 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 985 (1978); S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 38, at 134, 154.
128. Hearings, supra note 13, at 342.
129. Id. at 344.
130. Id.
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attorney general for legislative affairs, was the Justice Department
spokesperson during the Senate hearings.' 3 ' Mr. Rakestraw reit-
erated the Justice Department's understanding as stated by Mr.
Ruckelshaus in the earlier House hearings. 32 During all the leg-
islative hearings no one-neither representatives, nor senators,
nor witnesses-disputed the Justice Department's position on this
issue. Mr. Rakestraw expressed the Department's fear that the
use of "may" in rule 404(b) would lead some judges to conclude
that they had unfettered discretion in deciding whether to admit
relevant evidence of uncharged misconduct. 133 The final Senate
report attempted to allay that fear by declaring that the judge may
exclude relevant evidence of uncharged misconduct "only on the
basis of those considerations set forth in Rule 403."134 This legis-
lative history has led most courts1 35 to conclude that after decid-
ing that evidence of uncharged misconduct satisfies rule 404(b),
the judge may exclude the evidence only by applying the rule 403
test biased in favor of admissibility. By applying that test, the
courts necessarily eschew the common-law view allocating the
burden to the proponent of the evidence.
It might be argued that the common-law burden was so well
settled that Congress surely would have used more explicit lan-
guage if Congress had intended to repudiate the common law.
However, that argument flies in the face of the congressional
treatment of the business entry exception to the hearsay rule in
rule 803(6). At common law, it was well established that to bring
a document within the business entry exception, the proponent
had to demonstrate that it was the business' regular practice to
prepare the type of entry in question. 13 6 That proposition was at
least as well settled as the common-law allocation of the burden
on uncharged misconduct evidence. Despite the authorities limit-
ing the business entry doctrine to routine records, both the Advi-
131. Rules of Evidence, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1974).
132. Id. at 123.
133. Id. For the text of rule 404(b), see supra text accompanying note 10.
134. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1974) (prejudice, confusion,
waste of time), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7071.
135. See United States v. Leichtman, 742 F.2d 598, 604 n.6 (11 th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Walker, 710 F.2d 1062, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 995 (1984); United States v. Potter, 616 F.2d 384, 388-89 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 832 (1980); United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1315
(9th Cir. 1978).
136. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 38, §§ 306-308.
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sory Committee 13 7 and the Supreme Court138 wanted to eliminate
that foundational requirement. The committee asserted that the
courts had exhibited "a tendency unduly to emphasize a require-
ment of routineness and repetitiveness." 13 9 The House of Repre-
sentatives disagreed, stating that the limitation of the doctrine to
routine records is "a necessary further assurance of trustworthi-
ness." 140 The House Judiciary Committee accordingly "amended
the Rule to incorporate the limitation."' 14 1 Interestingly, the op-
ponents of the limitation thought that omitting the limitation
from rule 803(6) was sufficient to abolish the limitation. Likewise,
the proponents of the limitation apparently believed that it was
necessary to explicitly incorporate the limitation to preserve it.
The proponents and opponents both proceeded on the im-
plicit assumption that rule 402 means what it says. If the rules do
not impose a restriction on the admission of relevant evidence,
judges are not free to add the restriction as a matter of decisional
law even if the restriction was a hoary requirement of common
law. By the same reasoning, rules 402 through 404 overturn the
common law allocation of the burden on uncharged misconduct
evidence even though Congress did not expressly repudiate the
common-law view in the rules' text.
III. THE DESIRABILITY OF AMENDING RULE 404(b)
The previous section of this article considered the issue of
the allocation of the burden of proof for evidence of uncharged
misconduct from the perspective of statutory construction. That
section addressed the question of whether Congress did, in fact,
allocate the burden of proof to the proponent or the opponent.
This section prescinds from statutory interpretation to pose a dif-
ferent question: Should Congress have allocated the burden to
the opponent? Thus, this section examines whether the onus
137. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE U.S. JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 186 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as COMMITTEE ON RULES].
138. Rules of Evidence: Communication from Chief Justice of the United
States Transmitting the Proposed Rules of Evidence of the United States Courts
and Magistrates 130 (1973).
139. COMMITTEE ON RULES, supra note 137, at 186-87.
140. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7088, quoted in 4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803-11 (1984).
141. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973).
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should rest on the opponent or the proponent as a matter of
policy.
A. The General Soundness of the Allocation and Measure of the Burden
under Rule 403
In the previous section, we saw that in rule 403 Congress
chose to allocate the burden to the opponent and that Congress
weighted the burden heavily in favor of admissibility. As general
propositions, both legislative choices were wise.
Allocating the burden to the opponent reflects the primacy of
the search for truth in the litigation process. All the leading au-
thorities on American evidence law have suggested that the courts
and legislatures should recognize that primacy. At the turn of the
century, Thayer asserted that a fundamental principle of any ra-
tional body of evidence law is that "everything which is... proba-
tive should come in, unless a clear ground of policy or law
excludes it."142 Dean Wigmore counseled that "every intendment
should be made against ... a demand" that relevant evidence be
excluded. 43 In the post-World War II era, then Professor Wein-
stein reminded us that in the case of conflict, "The court's truth-
finding function should receive primary emphasis."' 144 The ad-
mission of all relevant evidence ordinarily promotes the public
interest in discovering the truth in litigation, 45 and that interest
is weightier than any of the competing interests listed in rule 403.
In its hearings on the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress
specifically was urged to recognize the primacy of the search for
truth in the litigation process. During the House hearings on
proposed rule 412 (restricting the admissibility of evidence of
rape complainants' sexual conduct), Roger Pauley, deputy chief
of the Legislation and Special Projects Section of the Criminal
Division, spoke on behalf of the Justice Department. 46 Mr.
Pauley urged Congress to place "priority on the principle of rele-
vance .... Relevance in terms of the search for truth is ... the
predominant interest.''47
142. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW
530 (1898).
143. 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2175, at 2 (3d ed. 1940). See also Weinstein,
Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 223, 237 (1966).
144. Weinstein, supra note 143, at 246.
145. Id. at 237, 243, 246.
146. Hearing, Privacy of Rape Victims, supra note 104, at 3.
147. Id. at 17.
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Even if the opposing interests were of equal weight, it would
be justifiable to allocate the burden to the opponent. This is so
because the exclusion of the relevant evidence undeniably de-
prives the trier of fact of helpful information, while it ordinarily is
only speculation that the admission of the evidence will prejudice
the jury. After the proponent shows the logical relevance of evi-
dence under rule 401, it is "unquestioned" that the evidence has
some probative value.' 48 Thus, the probative worth of the evi-
dence is demonstrable. In contrast, the countervailing considera-
tions listed in rule 403 are usually merely "risks."' 149 To be sure,
in a given case the likelihood of prejudice may be great rather
than remote. But there is a kernel of wisdom in the old bromide
that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Barring the evi-
dence certainly denies the trier proof, the relevance of which is
"unquestioned." Probative value is a reality, while prejudicial
danger ordinarily is only a risk. Thus, it makes sense to allocate
the burden to the opponent of relevant evidence.
Like the allocation of the burden to the opponent, the mea-
sure of the burden specified in rule 403 is defensible on policy
grounds. It would be ideal if the judge could quantify probative
value and danger and then contrast the two on a common, objec-
tive scale of measurement. We do not live in an ideal world, how-
ever, and judges are forced to make subjective value judgments
when balancing probative value against potential danger. 50 The
factors involved are intangible, 15' and there is a large element of
subjectivity in their evaluation. 52 Even if the judge could objec-
tively gauge either probative value or danger, the factors them-
selves could not be so measured against each other.'5 3 Striking a
balance between such factors is a "procrustean task,"' 54 and
judges will inevitably differ in the manner in which they balance
148. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note.
149. Id.
150. Hearings, supra note 13, at 193, 197 (comments of Alan B. Morrison).
151. United States v. Bowe, 360 F.2d 1, 15-16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
961 (1966); 1J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 403[04], at 403-65.
152. United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 985 (1978); 1J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 403[03], at 403-
33 to -34.
153. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5221, at 309.
154. Comment, Evidence-Other Crimes-Balancing Relevance and Need Against
Unfair Prudice to Determine the Admissibility of Other Unexplained Deaths as Proof of the
Corpus Delicti and the Perpetrator's Identity-United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127
(4th Cir. 1973), 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 173, 177 (1974).
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the factors. 1 55 Common sense suggests that these differences will
occur, and the most recent research supports the same
conclusion. 156
Rule 403 compensates for the subjectivity of the balancing
process by mandating a burden with an extraordinary measure.
Before excluding the evidence, the judge must first conclude that
the probative dangers outweigh the probative value, and then the
judge must engage in a sober second thought and ask himself or
herself whether the dangers do so "substantially." The judge
may bar the evidence only when there is a "significant tipping of
the scales."' 157 By requiring the judge to be so firmly convinced
of the propriety of exclusion, rule 403 insures that relevant evi-
dence is admitted whenever the balance is genuinely
debatable. ' 58
B. The Application of Rule 403's Burden to Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence
Although the allocation and measure of the burden under
rule 403 are generally sensible, at the very least the burden
should be shifted when the proffered evidence involves un-
charged misconduct. The severely prejudicial character of un-
charged misconduct evidence justifies allocating the burden to
the proponent, and that allocation would end the inconsistency
between rules 404(b) and 609.
The likelihood of prejudice is acute when the proffered evi-
dence is proof of a defendant's uncharged misconduct. As part of
the Chicago Jury Project, researchers attempted to determine the
impact of a defendant's prior criminal record on the probability
of conviction. 159 The researchers found that conviction rates were
significantly greater after a jury learned that the defendant had a
criminal record or had been charged with even a minor crime.
The researchers concluded that juries aware of prior misconduct
employ an entirely "different ... calculus of probabilities" to de-
155. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 403[03], at 403-51 to -
52.
156. See generally Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson, supra note 33.
157. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5221, at 309-10. See also
Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C.D. L. REV.
59, 94 (1984).
158. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5221, at 309.
159. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 178-79.
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termine the defendant's guilt or innocence. 160 In 1983, the Na-
tional Science Foundation released the results of research' 6'
designed to assess the reactions of lay jurors and judges to vari-
ous types of evidence. The research consisted of simulated trials,
in which the researchers used lay members of the community to
serve as jurors and attorneys as surrogates for judges. The re-
searchers found that there were frequent disagreements between
jurors and attorneys as groups, as well as among the individual
members of the two groups. The researchers did discover, how-
ever, that "the greatest agreement ... is found in connection with
evidence suggesting immoral conduct by the defendant."' 162 At-
torneys and lay persons alike consistently rated such evidence as
highly prejudicial.
These results could have been expected. A confession may
be the most damning type of prosecution evidence, but un-
charged misconduct evidence is not far behind. Furthermore, un-
charged misconduct is subject to greater abuse than confession
evidence. 63 A defendant's confession usually is offered as proof
of the facts admitted, and the jury ordinarily will use the confes-
sion for precisely that purpose. In the case of uncharged miscon-
duct evidence, however, the evidence often has dual relevance.
Evidence of uncharged misconduct may be admitted for some
limited purpose such as proving the defendant's motive. Under
such a theory the evidence would have the independent relevance
required by rule 404(b). Nevertheless, any act of misconduct by
the defendant also is relevant to show his general bad character,
and lay jurors are "imbued with the commonly held . . . notion,
'once a crook, always a crook.' "164
160. Id. at 179. See Beaser & Marques, A Proposal to Modify the Rule on Crimi-
nal Conviction Impeachment, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 585, 602 (1985).
161. See Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson, supra note 33.
162. Id. at 1162. See also Gray & Ashmore, Biasing Influence of Defendants'
Characteristics on Simulated Sentencing, 38 PSYCHOLOGY REP. 727 (1976); Greene &
Loftus, When Crimes Arejoined at Trial, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 193 (1985); Landy &
Aronson, The Influence of the Character of the Criminal and His Victim on the Decisions of
Simulated Jurors, 7J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 141 (1969); London School
of Economics (L.S.E.) Jury Project,Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L.
REV. 208 (1973); Nemeth & Sosis, A Simulated Jury Study: Characteristics of the De-
fendant and the Jurors, 90J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 221 (1973); Wissler & Saks, On the
Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions- When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide
Guilt, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1985); Comment, A Study of the California Penalty
Jury in First-Degree-Murder Cases, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1297, 1326 (1969) (evidence of
prior criminal record is strongest single factor that causes juries to impose death
peantly).
163. Dolan, supra note 39, at 226.
164. State v. Cook, 673 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
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In response, the courts have recognized the special dangers
posed by the dual relevance of uncharged misconduct evidence.
Thus, the courts evolved the common-law doctrine of balancing
probative value against probative danger in uncharged miscon-
duct cases. 1 6 5
There also is an apparent consensus among the courts that
uncharged misconduct is peculiarly dangerous and necessitates
unique safeguards. We already have seen that in many jurisdic-
tions, errors in the admission of uncharged misconduct are the
most common ground for reversal. 166 In some jurisdictions, trial
judges "uniformly" declare mistrials when the jury is exposed to
inadmissible evidence of uncharged misconduct. 67 Even some
appellate courts reverse the normal presumption that any error is
harmless and assume that any erroneous admission of uncharged
misconduct is prejudicial. 68 Furthermore, the courts and legisla-
tures of many jurisdictions have imposed special procedural re-
strictions governing the admission of evidence of uncharged
misconduct. These restrictions often include requirements for
pretrial notice by the prosecution of its intent to offer evidence of
uncharged misconduct at trial, 169 out-of-court hearings to adjudi-
cate the admissibility of such evidence, 70 limiting instructions
given at the time the evidence is admitted as well as in the final
jury charge,' 7' and explicit findings on the record by the trial
165. Dolan, supra note 39, at 279.
166. Note, Evidence-The Emotional Propensity Exception, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
153, 156 n.29 (1978).
167. State v. Cook, 673 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
168. State v. Brooks, 675 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v.
Brown, 670 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Schroeder, Evidentiary Use in
Criminal Cases of Collateral Crimes and Acts: A Comparison of the Federal Rules and Ala-
bama Law, 35 ALA. L. REV. 241, 242 (1984). See also United States v. Shackleford,
738 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1984). In Shackleford, the court stated:
Except in unusual circumstances, emanations from evidence of a de-
fendant's bad acts are almost always suggestive of a defendant's pro-
pensity to commit other bad or criminal acts and tend to impugn his or
her credibility, and errors in admitting such evidence consequently
often go to the fundamental fairness of the trial. Unless there is other
evidence that overwhelmingly establishes the defendant's guilt, we
think evidence of other acts or crimes will reasonably play a substantial
role in swaying the jury.
Id. at 783-84.
169. See, e.g., State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126, 130 (La. 1973).
170. See E. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 9.46
(1984).
171. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-301(3) (1978 & Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 90.404(2)(b) (West 1979 & Supp. 1984). See also Imwinkelried, Limiting
Instructions on Uncharged Misconduct Evidence: The Last Line of Defense Against Jury
Misuse of the Evidence, 8 TRIAL DIPLO., Fall 1985, at 23.
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judge. 172 The courts have hedged the process of admitting evi-
dence of uncharged misconduct with these safeguards because
the courts appreciate that the evidence can be devastating. It is
precisely this devastating effect of evidence of uncharged miscon-
duct which makes such evidence different from the run-of-the-mill
evidence to which rule 403 is applied. It may be the sheerest con-
jecture that the admission of a photograph challenged under rule
403 will prejudice the jury. However, empirical research indi-
cates, and many courts acknowledge, that evidence of uncharged
misconduct poses a grave likelihood of prejudice. In sum, there is
a compelling case for treating evidence of uncharged misconduct
differently and allocating the burden to the proponent.
Reallocation of the burden would bring rule 404(b) into
alignment with rule 609. Rule 609(a)(1) governs the admissibility
of evidence of certain types of convictions for purposes of im-
peachment, and it allocates the burden to the prosecution to
show that the probative value of the conviction evidence exceeds
its prejudicial dangers. 73 Allocating the burden to the propo-
nent under rule 609 but to the opponent under rule 404(b) is
unjustifiable, since evidence of uncharged misconduct offered
under rule 404(b) can be even more prejudicial than evidence of a
prior conviction introduced under rule 609. If the uncharged act
has not resulted in a conviction, the jury may leap to the conclu-
sion that the defendant has escaped unpunished for the act. 174
The jury may be tempted to punish the defendant for the un-
charged offense.175 Thejury may subconsciously desire to "sanc-
tion the defendant for another crime he seems to have 'got away
with.' ",176 In addition, the evidence of the defendant's un-
charged misconduct may alter the jury's regret matrix,1 77 in the
sense that the jurors may now have less concern and regret about
the possibility of an erroneous conviction. Thus, jurors may be
172. United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 205, 213-14 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1008 (1984).
173. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
174. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979); Sharpe, supra note 51, at 561, 589. Williams, The
Problem of Similar Fact Evidence, 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 281, 289 (1979).
175. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979); Sharpe, supra note 51, at 561, 589; Williams, supra
note 174, at 289.
176. Sharpe, supra note 51, at 561.
177. Id. at 561 n.23. See Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV.
1021, 1032-41 (1977). The regret matrix model is based upon the assumption
that individual such as jurors wish to minimize the expected regret felt in the
long run as a consequence of their decisions. Id. at 1032.
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more inclined to resolve doubt in the prosecution's favor. Given
these considerations, it makes little sense to give the defendant
more protection under rule 609 when evidence proffered under
rule 404(b) can be more prejudicial. The inconsistency between
rules 404(b) and 609, coupled with the exceptionally prejudicial
character of uncharged misconduct evidence, lead to the conclu-
sion that Congress has misallocated the burden on uncharged
misconduct. Rule 404(b) should be amended to shift the burden
to the proponent, who had the risk of non-persuasion at common
law and who ought to bear the burden in the interests of justice.
IV. THE NECESSITY FOR AMENDING RULE 404(b)
The second section of this article noted that uncharged mis-
conduct evidence is extremely prejudicial. Moreover, the courts
are conscious of the fact that evidence of uncharged misconduct
can poison jurors' minds against the defendant. 178 How will that
consciousness affect the courts' administration of rule 404(b) and,
more broadly, the Federal Rules of Evidence?
In the short term, as a result of their recognition of the dan-
ger of uncharged misconduct evidence, some courts may feel im-
pelled to revive the common-law allocation of the burden.
Suppose, for example, that the case arises in a jurisdiction where
the appellate courts have surrounded uncharged misconduct evi-
dence with a host of special procedural safeguards and in which
errors in the admission of uncharged misconduct are the leading
ground for appellate reversal. Assume further that the trial judge
is familiar with the empirical studies of the impact of uncharged
misconduct evidence and understands that the admission of such
evidence will likely motivate some jurors to convict although they
have a bona fide doubt about the defendant's guilt of the charged
offense. Finally, suppose that prior to the state legislature's adop-
tion of the Federal Rules, it was black letter law in the jurisdiction
that the prosecutor had the burden of showing that the probative
value of any uncharged misconduct outweighs the prejudicial
dangers. It is understandable that a judge in this position might
conclude that rule 404(b) leaves the common-law allocation
intact.
If judges follow this inclination, however, one consequence
will be the undermining of rule 402.179 One of the purposes of
178. H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 205, at 447 (5th ed. 1956).
179. FED. R. EvID. 402.
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rule 402 was the abrogation of common-law rules not grounded
in constitutional or statutory authority. 80 It is true that rule 402
is less radical than the corresponding provisions in some earlier
model evidence codes.' 18 Rule 9 of the 1942 Model Code of Evi-
dence purported to abolish all pre-existing exclusionary rules ex-
cept those "provided in the following Rules."' 81 2 The 1953
Uniform Rules of Evidence contained a similar provision, effect-
ing a wholesale abolition of prior exclusionary rules.' 83 The
draftsmen of uniform rule 7 avowed an intent to "wipe the slate
clean of all . . . limitations on the admissibility of relevant evi-
dence."' 1 4 Both the Model Code and the Uniform Rules would
have repealed all the earlier exclusionary rules and permitted the
courts to enforce only the rules expressly included therein. 8 5
Rule 402 has a more modest effect. Under rule 402, pre-existing
exclusionary rules survive to the extent that they are based on
"the Constitution of the United States.... Act of Congress, . . . or
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statu-
tory authority."' 8 6 Thus, the only retroactive impact of rule 402
is the abolition of "rules that are found in judicial decisions and
that are not based upon some provision in the constitution or on
federal statutes." 87
Rule 402 has an important prospective effect as well.'8 8 Rule
402 attempts to prevent the courts from creating new evidentiary
rules by common-law process. 189 After a careful review of the
legislative history of the federal rules, Professors Wright and Gra-
ham concluded that "the record rather strongly suggests that
Congress assumed that, except where the Evidence Rules other-
wise provide, there would be no decisional law of evidence."' 90
To support their conclusion, Wright and Graham marshaled nu-
merous passages from the congressional hearings on the pro-
posed rules.19' Those hearings included testimony that revisions
180. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5199, at 220.
181. Id. § 5192, at 177.
182. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 9 (1942); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 96, § 5191, at 174 n.13.
183. See UNIF. R. EvID. 7 (1953).
184. Id. See also 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5192, at 178.
185. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5192, at 177.
186. FED. R. EvID. 402.
187. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5199, at 220.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 221.
190. Id. at 222.
191. Id. at 222-23.
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of evidentiary doctrines "by judicial decision will in all probability
be prevented,"' 92 and that the rules "exclude the possibility of
further judicially created" doctrines. 193 Thus, rule 402 was in-
tended, at least in part, to preclude the power of the courts to
change the rule.
The draftsmen of many state codes patterned after the Fed-
eral Rules adopted the same construction of rule 402. For exam-
ple, the draftsmen of the Vermont Rules of Evidence expressly
recognized Congress' construction of rule 402 and stated in the
note to their rule 402 that the rule was designed to eliminate
prior decisional law. 194 In other states, when the draftsmen did
not want their codes to preclude common-law evidentiary devel-
opment, the draftsmen explicitly indicated their intent. For ex-
ample, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly reserved the
common-law power to revise evidence law in its order promulgat-
ing the rules. 195 The New York draftsmen similarly included a
provision in the text of their version of rule 402 that attempted to
preserve the common-law power to a limited extent. 196 Finally,
the Oregon draftsmen specifically included the expression, "deci-
sional law," in their adaptation of rule 402.197 The courts' renais-
sance of the common-law allocation of the burden to the
proponent of uncharged misconduct evidence consequently
would infringe rule 402.198
More fundamentally, the courts' revival of the common-law
rule would tend to thwart the codification effort. Rule 402's ante-
cedent, uniform rule 7, was hailed as "the keystone" of the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence. 199 Like uniform rule 7, rule 402
192. Id. at 222 n.17.
193. Id. at 222-23 n.21.
194. VT. R. EVID. 402 reporter's note; 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 96, § 5199, at 152 n.17 (Supp. 1985).
195. P. THOMPSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: EVIDENCE 5 (1979); 22 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5199, at 152 n.17 (Supp. 1985).
196. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5199, at 152 n.9 (Supp.
1985).
197. Id. at 129 n.121, 152 n.9.
198. See United States v. Grajeda, 570 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1978) (given
rule 402, courts are no longer "free to establish rules of evidence independent
of the Federal Rules"); United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 777 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978) (explaining that "the obvious purpose of
the catchall clause" in rule 402 "was to bar common law rules of evidence");
State v. Heiner, 683 P.2d 629, 634 (Wyo. 1984) (rule 402 precluded trial judge
from excluding relevant evidence because of the unfair manner in which the
evidence had been obtained).
199. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5192, at 177 (quoting
N.J. SuP. CT. COMM. ON EVIDENCE, REPORT 10 (1953)).
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functions as the centerpiece of the Federal Rules. 200 Rule 402 is
at the core of the federal codification effort. 20' Admittedly, in
some respects, the Federal Rules of Evidence are an incomplete
code. 20 2 For example, the rules direct the courts to continue the
common-law development of the presumption and privilege doc-
trines.20 3 In all other areas, however, the rules purport to be a
self-contained, comprehensive code. Ideally, a codification
should "furnish answers to most and perhaps all the questions
likely to arise in connection with its matter." 20 4 By barring com-
mon-law exclusionary rules, rule 402 helps ensure that the courts
will seek the answers to evidentiary questions by reference to the
rules themselves. When the courts look elsewhere and revive
common-law rules, the courts not only are violating rule 402; but
they also are subverting the rules as a code. If the rules are to
succeed as a code, the courts must follow rule 402's directive to
reject exclusionary rules based solely on common-law
traditions. 20 5
The current dispute over the revival of the common-law bur-
den on uncharged misconduct evidence poses a threat to the fu-
ture success of the Federal Rules. The courts may succumb to the
temptation to slight rule 402 and revive the common-law tradi-
tion. This danger is far from hypothetical. The history of other
American evidence codes teaches that the controversy over un-
charged misconduct evidence is the very sort of issue that can be
the undoing of a code. 20 6 For example, Kansas adopted the uni-
form Rules of Evidence, including rule 402's antecedent, uniform
rule 7. Kansas' version of Uniform rule 45, however, is peculiar.
While uniform rule 45, like rule 403, permits the judge to exclude
relevant evidence on the basis of "undue prejudice," 20 7 Kansas'
version of uniform rule 45 omits any reference to prejudice.208
200. 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 83, § 111, at 867.
201. The armed services have adopted Military Rules of Evidence patterned
after the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note
15, 402[07], at 402-28. The drafters' analysis of the new Military Rules de-
clares that "Rule 402 is potentially the most important of the new rules." Id. at
402-29.
202. Younger, Introduction: Symposium: The Federal Rules of Evidence, 12 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 251, 252 (1984).
203. See FED. R. EviD. 301, 501.
204. Younger, supra note 202, at 252.
205. 1 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 83, § 114, at 879-80.
206. See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5199.
207. UNIF. R. EvID. 45 (1953).
208. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-445 (1983).
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Nevertheless, in State v. Davis,20 9 the Kansas Supreme Court held
that the court retained the common-law power to exclude rele-
vant evidence on the ground of prejudice. 210 The issue presented
in Davis was the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence.
In justifying its decision to refer to the common law, the Kansas
Supreme Court stressed the prejudicial character of uncharged
misconduct evidence. 211
The propensity of courts to slight the intent of an evidence
code in order to reach a desirable result is also evident in the
controversy over scientific evidence. Many courts assume that sci-
entific evidence can have a very prejudicial impact on lay ju-
rors.21 2 This assumption is one of the primary rationales for the
so-called Frye rule, requiring the proponent of scientific evidence
to establish that the technique generally is accepted in the rele-
vant scientific field. 213 Like the common-law burden on un-
charged misconduct evidence, the Frye rule is a judicial creation.
The rule is nowhere codified in the Model Code, the Uniform
Rules, or the Federal Rules. Thus, there is a powerful argument
that the rule is no longer good law in a jurisdiction that has en-
acted any of those evidence codes. 214 In several such jurisdic-
tions, however, courts have continued to apply Frye.215 Like the
Davis court, the courts upholding Frye emphasize the potential
prejudice generated by novel scientific evidence.2 16
209. 213 Kan. 54, 515 P.2d 802 (1973).
210. Id. at 59, 515 P.2d at 806. See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note
96, § 5199, at 223 n.23.
211. 213 Kan. at 58-59, 515 P.2d at 806.
212. See generally Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A
Critique from the Perspective ofJuror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554, 562-63 (1983)
(citing and quoting People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr.
497 (1968) (Mathematics is "a veritable sorcerer in our computerized society"
and "threatens to cast a spell" over the lay juror); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24,
549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976) (recognizing "misleading aura of cer-
tainty which often envelops a new scientific process"); United States v. Addison,
498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (recognizing "mystic infallibility" of scien-
tific testimony)).
213. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See gener-
ally Imwinkelried, supra note 212.
214. Imwinkelried, supra note 212, at 557-59.
215. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1230 n.257 (1980) (citing
People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976); State v.
Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (Law Div. 1968), aft'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264
A.2d 209 (1970)).
216. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144
(1976). See also Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 1028,
1032 (5th Cir. 1984) (evidence at issue was based on "voice stress analysis," a
kind of polygraph testing that measures psychological stress in the voice).
1985] 1495
31
Imwinkelried: The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The experience in California is instructive. The language of
section 351 of the California Evidence Code is strikingly similar
to that of rule 402. Section 351 states that "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible. '" 21 7 Sec-
tion 351 also is similar to rule 402 in intent, since the draftsmen
of the California Evidence Code intended to preclude the devel-
opment of court-made exclusionary rules. 218 The California
courts, however, frustrated that intent.2 19 When they confronted
prejudicial types of evidence such as scientific proof,22 0 especially
statistical evidence, 22 1 the California courts often disregarded
section 351 and fashioned rules to block the admission of the evi-
dence. 222 The rules were usually pre-existing common-law doc-
trines such as Frye.2 23 To square the result with the California
Evidence Code, the courts often asserted that the legislature cer-
tainly could have found more explicit language to overturn "a
firmly established and fundamental common-law rule." 224 The
above history of the Federal Rules, including congressional treat-
ment of the business entry exception in rule 803(6), demonstrates
that such assertions are spurious arguments for resurrecting com-
mon-law exclusionary rules. The history of the earlier state
codes, however, indicates that courts often succumb to the temp-
tation to use such arguments to bar dangerously prejudicial evi-
dence. One distinguished commentator has predicted that, when
faced with prejudicial evidence, "as appears to be the case in Cali-
fornia, the [federal] courts will operate largely by ignoring" the
mandate of rule 402.225
217. CAL. EVID. CODE § 351 (West 1966 & Supp. 1984).
218. See generally 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5199, at 221.
219. Id. at 223.
220. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144
(1976) (evidence was produced by new technique of speaker identification by
spectrographic analysis, commonly described as "voice print").
221. See People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497
(1968) (testimony of college mathematics professor pertaining to mathematical
theory of probability of persons with defendants' distinctive characteristics hav-
ing committed robbery).
222. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5199, at 224 (California
courts have "exhibited disdain for the limitations of the code"). See also Graham,
California's "Restatement" of Evidence: Some Reflections on Appellate Repair of the Codifi-
cation Fiasco, 4 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 279 (1971).
223. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144
(1976).
224. People v. Starr, 11 Cal. App. 3d 574, 89 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1970).
225. Hearings, Rules of Evidence, supra note 98, at 195, 199 (letter of Professor
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.).
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V. CONCLUSION
At the outset of this article, we noted that many common law
courts allocate to the prosecutor the burden of convincing the
judge that the probative value of evidence of the defendant's un-
charged misconduct outweighs any attendant dangers. Although
there is authority that the common-law allocation survived the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the sounder reading
of the rules is that the rules change the common-law doctrine.
Rule 404(b) incorporates rule 403's balancing test, and rule 403
allocates to the defense the burden of showing that the prejudicial
danger of evidence substantially outweighs its probative value.
The common-law view, however, is preferable to the result under
rule 404(b) as presently written. To bring rule 404(b) into align-
ment with rule 609 and to curb the severe prejudice created by
admitting evidence of uncharged misconduct, Congress should
amend rule 404(b). Congress should revise the rule to read:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissi-
ble to prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of mo-
tive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 226 Before
the judge admits evidence for such a purpose, the pro-
ponent of the evidence must persuade the judge that the
probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of
unfair prejudice. 227
It is vital that Congress adopt an amendment such as the one
proposed. The importance of the dispute over the burden on un-
charged misconduct evidence extends beyond rule 404(b). The
dispute implicates the future of the Federal Rules of Evidence as
an integral code. The experience of other American evidence
codes indicates that if Congress remains silent, the courts will be
tempted to revive the common-law allocation of the burden even
at the expense of slighting rule 402. The courts, both federal and
state, realize how prejudicial uncharged misconduct can be. In
the past, many courts have disregarded statutes like rule 402 in
order to curb the admission of what they perceived as prejudicial
226. To this point, the wording of the statute is identical to the current rule
404(b).
227. "The danger of unfair prejudice" is the expression Congress chose to
include in rule 412(c)(3).
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evidence. The danger that courts will disregard rule 402, and by
so doing undermine the success of the Federal Rules as a self-
contained code, is imminent.
The current controversy over the burden on uncharged mis-
conduct is not an isolated instance. In a growing number of
cases, courts are espousing exclusionary rules that are omitted
from the text of the Federal Rules.2 28 For example, some federal
courts have restricted the use of pleadings as evidence 229 and
barred testimony by attorneys involved in a case despite the lack
of basis for such restrictions in the text of the rules.2 30 Many
courts also continue to enforce the Frye test for the admission of
scientific evidence 23 ' despite both rule 402 and the liberal opin-
ion provisions of article VII of the Federal Rules. On its face, rule
410, governing the admissibility of statements made during plea
bargaining, excludes the statements only when they are offered
"against the defendant." 23 2 At least one court, however, has em-
ployed the rule to bar such statements when the defense offered
the statements against the prosecution. 23 3
All the proposed exclusionary rules espoused in these cases
are well intentioned. The prevailing wisdom is that the encour-
agement of plea bargaining is in the interest of the criminal jus-
tice system, and it serves that interest to exclude the prosecutor's
statements as well as those by the defendant. 234 Similarly, the ex-
clusion of testimony by attorney-witnesses creates an incentive for
attorneys to comply with the rules of legal ethics that generally
forbid such testimony. 235 As in the case of the courts attempting
to restrict the admission of uncharged misconduct, many courts
upholding Frye believe that they are protecting the defendant
from excessively prejudicial evidence. Moreover, in many in-
228. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 194, § 5199, at 152.
229. See Garman v. Griffin, 666 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1981); 22 C. WRIGHT &
K. GRAHAM, supra note 196, § 5199, at 153, n.36.
230. See United States v. Johnston, 664 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1981); 22 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 96, § 5199, at 153 n.36.
231. Giannelli, supra note 215, at 1228-3 1.
232. FED. R. EVID. 410.
233. United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1976).
234. Id. at 107 (defendants properly prevented from introducing evidence
as to plea bargaining despite their contention that such evidence would tend to
show lengths to which Government had gone to obtain evidence needed to pros-
ecute defendants).
235. TRIAL EVIDENCE COMM., SECT. OF LITIGATION, A.B.A., EMERGING
PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 84 (1983) ("No provision
excludes a statement made, in any phase of negotiation, by a prosecutor-
officer.").
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stances, including the Frye rule and the burden on uncharged mis-
conduct evidence, the exclusionary rules being espoused are
supported by long lines of common-law authority.
These well intentioned proposals, however, miss an essential
point. They refuse to come to grips with the problem of recon-
ciling the proposed doctrine with the history, intent, and text of
rule 402. It is not enough that there are legitimate, even compel-
ling, policy arguments favoring the proposal. It is not even
enough that the proposed doctrine is a veritable fixture in the
common law of evidence. If an item of evidence satisfies the defi-
nition of relevance in rule 401, there are only two evidentiary
routes to excluding the evidence. 23 6 The opponent may invoke a
general exclusionary rule based on the Constitution, a statute, or
a rule of the Supreme Court, or the opponent may invite the
judge to apply rule 403 on an ad hoc basis to the specific item of
evidence proffered. If the evidence is logically relevant, however,
and if the opponent cannot successfully use either route to ex-
clude the evidence, rule 402 requires that the evidence must be
admitted. The rule forbids the judge from creating a new com-
mon-law exclusionary rule of general applicability.
We ask a great deal of courts when we expect them to enforce
statutes that overturn court-created doctrines and deprive them
of their traditional power to formulate evidentiary rules. It is par-
ticularly tempting for them to usurp a statute when the statute
seems to sanction the admission of such prejudicial evidence as
uncharged misconduct. Rule 404(b) should be amended to rein-
state the common-law burden protecting the defendant against
dangerous uncharged misconduct evidence, and it should be
amended immediately. Evidence such as uncharged misconduct
creates an acute risk that the courts will disregard rule 402 to
reach the expedient result. In slighting rule 402, the courts will
be undermining the codification effort itself. Rule 402 is "poten-
tially the most important" of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 237
236. Of course, there may be a non-evidentiary doctrine that leads to the
exclusion of the evidence. For example, a constitutional rule may require exclu-
sion. Thus, the fourth amendment may necessitate barring a witness' testimony
if the police would never have discovered the witness' identity but for a fourth
amendment violation. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978). Simi-
larly, civil procedure doctrines may authorize the exclusion of the evidence. For
example, the trial judge could exclude a witness' testimony as a discovery sanc-
tion if the witness violated a discovery order to disclose the names of all wit-
nesses. Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979), af'd, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
Our focus in this article is with evidence law proper.
237. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 93, 402[07], at 402-22
(quoting the drafters' analysis of Military Rule of Evidence 402).
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Congress must intervene before the courts start down the slip-
pery slope of circumventing rule 402 in order to restrict the ad-
mission of prejudicial uncharged misconduct.
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